Is Fejsa the missing piece of the Benfica puzzle?

Ljubomir Fejsa in his first full start for Benfica against Anderlecht
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Transfers are an odd thing.  Spend a huge amount of money on a player and expectation tracks them like a spotlight on a stage.  Spend a small amount – and sometimes getting fans to notice you at all is half the charm.

This past week, Benfica played Anderlecht in their first group stage match of this season’s Champions League campaign.  The lineup, deeply affected by the injuries to first choice players Nico Gaitán and Eduardo Salvio, was adapted accordingly to allow for the presence of new signings Markovic and Djuricic, but one name in particular was new to the starting lineup.  Benfica’s new defensive midfielder, Serbian Ljubomir Fejsa made his 2^nd appearance for the club since signing from Olympiacos in the summer. 

After the match, the unassuming Serbian was arguably Benfica’s most important player on the pitch.  Fejsa’s performance wasn’t spectacular, but was (crucially) tactically valuable… and it gave some indications that by luck or plan, Benfica may have very quietly signed a very important piece of their title-challenging puzzle.

First Impressions

Last season provided several examples of Benfica’s vulnerability on the counter attack, and much of it resulted from a lack of defensive cover offered by the shape of the team.  Nemanja Matic, a natural central midfielder (as opposed to a defensive midfielder) was often asked to play both protector of the back 2 as well as a key part of the build up play into the opposition area, and this often left the Serbian with too much ground to cover to defend against counter attacks.  Benfica’s vulnerable high defensive line would often leave gaps not only in behind Luisão and Garay, but also down the flanks (highlighted in yellow circles) due to the attacking endeavours of Maxi and Melgarejo.

The introduction of a proper defensive midfielder, however, immediately changes things for Benfica.  Fejsa showed tactical discipline against Anderlecht to ensure he protected the channel (as highlighted by the movement arrows and the yellow rectangle) in front of the centre back line.  He didn’t do it alone, obviously – Matic also played this role on the left of centre.  The team’s general shape against Anderlecht did illustrate however, the value Fejsa adds in offering proper protection against counter attacks and the attacking movements of the fullbacks.  The team’s shape ultimately ended up more of a 4231 – with the double pivot of Fejsa and Matic working well to offer defensive cover and attacking support.

Fejsa vs. Anderlecht

The question is of course, whether or not the tactical theory was proven by the actual performance of the team and Fejsa’s contribution to the game against Anderlecht.  Benfica lined up against the Belgian side in a loose 433 formation, with Fejsa largely staying just right of centre throughout the match in the middle of the pitch for most of the match.  While Fejsa wasn’t directly instrumental in the 2 goals scored by Djuricic and Luisão, his impact on the game defensively was obvious.

Fejsa’s defensive contribution was crucial to the Eagles, recovering the ball 6 times (out of 37).  The Serbian also contributed a quarter of the team’s interceptions (4) and tackles (7), including 2 crucially in the box.  Much of his defensive activity was down the right, to compensate for the movement of André Almeida and Enzo Pérez into forward positions to join the attack, or to assist Almeida with Anderlecht attacks down the flank.  Consider that in the absence of a Fejsa, one (or both) of 2 scenarios is likely – more successful counter attacks against exposed centre-backs, and / or an overworked Matic would have needed to make up the ground to cover the gaps.

Instead, Fejsa offered greater protection and the tactical discipline to make sure he protected the space in behind whoever was attacking down the right, minimizing the all too familiar risk of Benfica being caught on the counter attack.

That’s not to suggest Fejsa concentrated his positioning only in the central / right midfield.  He was responsible for a tenth of Benfica’s passes on the night (31 out of 317) and he managed to vary his positioning wherever the play required him to be.

What is also interesting about his passing are the recipients.  Fejsa’s passing distribution implied a comfort with allowing play to build up from the back via the flanks, something which Benfica needs to be doing more of (particularly in terms of controlling games with possession).  The most frequent recipient of Fejsa’s passes was Siqueira (6), while Luisão, Matic, Almeida, Ola John and Markovic all received 2 passes each.

The effect Fejsa’s presence had on Nemanja Matic was pivotal.  There’s a school of thought that Benfica’s best player of last season shouldn’t be playing as the defensive midfielder and his passing talents in particular would be better employed in the build-up towards goal further up the pitch.  The passing chart suggests that Matic still operated in a box to box manner, but for once, he didn’t have to operate across the entire pitch. He was able to cover more effectively for Siqueira’s moves down the left flank and link up more often in the attacking 3^rd, as can be seen by his passing distribution.

Matic also spent more time providing the attacking play, with passes to Siqueira (10), Markovic (6), Djuricic and Ola John (5 each). 

Tactical Conclusions

Granted, one shouldn’t read too much into the Anderlecht match.  It’s one fixture, against a weaker side.  However, there’s certainly a case for Fejsa offering Benfica a whole new set of options in tactical versatility.  The most important aspect he offers is the ability to protect the centre back line more effectively, but there are many other benefits as well.  Matic and Enzo can now push forward with less concern of the protection needed behind them.  Given their ability to press, it gives Benfica further opportunity to regain possession closer to the opponent’s goal, offering additional advantages for Benfica to dominate games.

It also offers a proper double pivot in midfield.  The merits of a proper 3 man midfield have also been debated by several Benfiquistas, especially given Porto’s successful application of such a system in recent years.  Last season’s loss of Javi Garcia and Axel Witsel limited Benfica’s options in being able to leverage players in a 3 man midfield. Now, not only does Fejsa give that opportunity, but Benfica can use a proper double pivot to good effect in the manner that both Fejsa and Matic went about their business against Anderlecht.

Probably the most enticing aspect of Fejsa’s inclusion is the fact that he brings stability to the midfield to the extent that it offers the freedom to experiment, without fear of unbalancing the team’s defensive shape, with the configuration in the attacking 3^rd.  Benfica could easily line up in a 433, 4231, or 442 Diamond formation and rotate the talents of Markovic and Djuricic especially, while still maintaining a core midfield duo of Fejsa and Matic.

Benfica's collective display was much better against the Belgian side
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So in conclusion – a good start to Fejsa’s Benfica career, and some genuine reason to be positive about the contribution he could make to the team’s success.  Here’s hoping the master-stroke that brought the Serbian to the club is leveraged properly by Jorge Jesus… because if it is, Benfica may no longer be just a collective of talented individuals.  They may also end up with a midfield that not only rivals Porto – but surpasses them.

Get that right and Benfica may just yet become the cohesive unit - the true team - that they have the potential to be.  

Benfica’s Preseason Posed More Questions Than Answers

 

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In modern football, pre-season is a bit like a first date – if it seems to go well, your mind races ahead to all the possibilities that could develop, and there are more reasons that are prevalent as to why it could work, and why it will succeed.  But if it bombs, or goes less than planned, most will play it down, talk about the fact that “you can’t make a judgment on one date” and it may take time to get things right – ultimately a rationale to avoid reading too much into a “poor” start affecting future prospects.

In SL Benfica’s case, the pre-season campaign has produced the latter.  There are mixed feelings amongst many Benfiquistas – some of us are nauseatingly optimistic, convinced that ultimately the results and performances are irrelevant, because the campaign is all about preparing the squad’s various members to reach the required fitness levels. Others (like myself) can’t help but over-analyse the pre-season matches to provide a window to the season ahead, because especially after the heartache that was season 2012-13, many Benfica fans are desperately trying to find some obvious signals that the club won’t be making the same mistakes in the new season.

On the face of it, the results aren’t too bad.  Excluding the Taça de Honra games, the team’s record was 5 wins, 2 draws and 2 defeats in 9 matches.  22 goals in 9 games is a healthy return, especially given the investments in the squad’s attacking resources.  But 15 goals conceded with no clean sheets for a team that invested in 3 new centre backs, 2 new fullbacks doesn’t sound healthy.

Money Well Spent

For the sake of balance, let’s start with the positives, because they certainly were there.  Benfica’s transfer activity in the summer was decisive and plentiful, with a large number of signings coming in early.  Given the nature of the signings, it’s clear the Eagles expected pressure in being able to keep certain key players at CB (Garay), and on the wings (Gaitan, Salvio).  It’s commendable that the club made a positive effort in dealing with the squad depth, which is certainly in much better health than last season. 

Some of the new players looked impressive in pre-season fixtures too, only adding to the confidence.  Steven Vitòria looked solid in most games, and illustrated some of the experience he already has in Liga football (having played with Estoril for 3 years).  The Argentine Lisandro Lopez looks reasonably quick and already has a goal to back up his uncanny knack for meeting opportunities at set-pieces.

While Sulejmani seemed to lack the fitness at times befitting of a wing forward role in the team, his technical ability looked special.  He showed a great ability to anticipate and follow up crosses toward the far post very well.  His footwork may not be of the same level as Salvio, but it’s not far off.  The Serbian winger is a typical Jorge Jesus type signing in that he has solid attacking instincts and great individual technique.

http://www.futebol24.com/eusebio-cup-benfica-estreia-tres-reforcos-na-luz/

But without doubt, the main impressions created in pre-season came from Lazar Markovic and Filip Djuricic, both of whom contributed significantly, with the former scoring 4 goals and the latter creating 3 in the matches they played.  Markovic showed silky individual skills and the ability to create opportunities all on his own with little reliance on things around him.  The maestro has already been likened to the legend João Vieira Pinto (not least of which because of a similar build, appearance and playing style).  Markovic was the most expensive transfer for Benfica this transfer window and he’s shown enough already to suggest the money was well invested in a player who could already contribute substantially despite his current age (19).  Djuricic meanwhile has also drawn comparisons to another club legend, namely Rui Manuel Costa.  The comparisons are justified in the sense that the Serbian plays a similar role to the Portuguese Benfica fan favourite.  Djuricic seems the more like-for-like replacement of Pablo Aimar’s role in the team (a position I hoped would be filled in previous Benfica blogs). 

There were other positives too from the current squad.  Lima’s excellent form continued as he scored 6 goals, Salvio set up 4 goals across the matches he played in, and there were solid cameos from Matic, Amorim and Rodrigo, amongst others.  And while the end of the transfer window is still not upon us, the fact that Benfica still have the squad intact with the presence of Garay, Gaitàn and Salvio is highly encouraging from the perspective of retaining their quality and experience.  There’s no doubt that the team’s ability to accumulate the 22 goals it did in pre-season is a testament to the ability of Benfica’s attacking strengths to penetrate defences.

The best defence is a strong attack… or is it?

Now while those positives are obvious and certainly commendable, there are concerns, that if unchecked, could become not only significant, but ultimately crippling to a title challenges.  The biggest issue – hands down – is that the team's inherent weaknesses from last season don’t seem to have been addressed.  And if that the case despite making signings in those positions, then either Benfica bought poorly, or Jorge Jesus’ tactical setup isn’t working as it should.

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I perceive the issue as an unhealthy mixture of both.  This is embodied perfectly in the signings at fullback.  Bruno Cortez’s nationality, appearance and attacking demeanor threatens to remind one of Real Madrid’s left back Marcelo… until you discover his touches aren’t as clean, and his positional sense is terrible.  Many an occasion in pre-season, he displayed an inability to track back when pushing up too far and allowing his colleagues to be exposed at the back.  But that’s not just a function of his poor tactical discipline, it’s also due to Jorge Jesus’ insistence to play an entertaining, but somewhat reckless and dangerous style.  Typically when teams use fullbacks to offer width, wingers will “invert” and come inside, while central midfielders are supposed to drop back to assist central defenders to prevent the counter.  Benfica aren’t very good at this exact quality, especially against sides with pace, or half decent tactical application.

The likes of Cortez and Silvio therefore, as new additions to the squad, haven’t displayed anything – yet – that gives comfort to the need for an improvement at left back.  Instead, the two signings offer as much doubt as there was with last season’s converted left back, Melgarejo.

Another concern defensively is that of goalkeeper Artur, whose form is questionable.  However, Benfica’s mismanagement of the situation regarding talented youngster Jan Oblak effectively has reduced the Brazilian’s competition to veteran Paulo Lopes, and rookie Mika, both of whom aren’t good enough to challenge Artur for a first team place.  The lack of proper cover could be a issue, if Artur doesn’t cease to bring nerves in Benfica’s backline.

Jorge Jesus also seems relatively insure of his favoured lineup, or favoured system.  Benfica’s use of a loose 4-4-2 formation, especially against Napoli was ineffective and did little to hide the soft centre in Benfica midfield.  This isn’t, of course, due to any lack in quality of Matic and Enzo, but rather again comes down to Jesus’ preference that the two of them push forward considerably, leaving the centre backs exposed.  It also isn’t clear who Jesus prefers at left back, or in the central attacking midfield position (Djuricic or Markovic).   

http://www.sportsdirectnews.com/european-football/27435-cardozo-set-for-benfica-exit-agent.php

One of the other controversial issues is that of the absence of Cardozo.  His potential exit leaves the team short of a player who lacks mobility, but not for technique, height, power and a consistency that the inexperience of Markovic or Rodrigo cannot replace.  Benfica’s style suits Lima, but ironically, 4-4-2 works better with Cardozo as the 2^nd striker as opposed to Lima and Rodrigo, for example.  After Cardozo’s apology, it’s unclear if Benfica plan to even use him, but assuming they don’t, or that he departs in some form in the remaining days of the transfer window, the Eagles will certainly need to refine their approach and use of the current attacking options.  Goals from the inverted wingers need to become more extensive (which makes Salvio’s form in pre-season extremely encouraging), and the creative talents of Djuricic and Markovic will be especially important in leveraging the movement of Lima and Rodrigo.

Reading too much – or too little – into pre-season

Of course, in a sense, all these criticisms can ultimately be irrelevant observations that don’t speak anything over the team’s chances in the league.  There’s no real correlation between a relatively good / bad pre-season and a relatively good / bad season.  And in the case of Benfica, there still remains the divided opinion with respect to Jorge Jesus, and those opposed to him will likely be as cynical as I’ve been, if not worse.

Nonetheless, there are some key learnings from pre-season, made all the more complicated to assess since, out of all Benfica’s opponents (with respect), only Bordeaux and Napoli were remotely of a strength comparable to the level that Benfica should ideally be testing themselves against.  Benfica have still got considerable issues in balance.  While the effort to sign players to cover for weaknesses was certainly there, some of those players haven’t yet inspired confidence.  The team still looks likely to leak goals from tactical application of over-zealous attack, rather than developing the ability to get a 1-0 lead and control the game to a winning conclusion.

But there are considered positives as well.  The signings of Djuricic and Markovic, and the return of Amorim, gives the team the ability to use different tactical setups, and different variations of formations, which could come in handy.  The depth of the team is extremely healthy in most cases.  And even though Jorge Jesus loves to play high risk, high reward reckless attacking football, luckily in the Liga, there are arguably only 3-4 teams that really could cause Benfica problems, and Benfica have enough talent to get away with their chosen strategy to beat most of them.

Benfica faces the unusual situation of having all the pressure on them even though they aren’t defending the title.  The club’s reputation, the fallout of the near-treble success last season, the number of transfers and the changes in manager at Porto, Braga and Sporting effectively means that the Eagles are logically perceived as the team most well positioned to take the title.

Time will tell if Jorge Jesus’ team duly obliges.  Because if next season is as close as last season’s title race, it is quite obvious which match in the Liga calendar is most likely to decide the title.

Hopefully by then, pre-season’s a long distant memory, and Benfica enter the Dragão better balanced and prepared to beat Porto... and finally earn another Liga victory for Jorge Jesus.

Bring on the new season. Força Benfica.

The 2013-14 Benfiquista Wishlist

http://www.zimbio.com/pictures/ur1-m19uStk/SL+Benfica+v+Chelsea+UEFA+Champions+League/qhXK2PkJUYw/Jorge+Jesus

For some, the 2012-13 Benfica campaign was something special to behold.  The team’s progress in various competitions was incredible considering certain factors, not least of which was the departure of two of the side’s key midfielders in Javi Garcia and Axel Witsel.  Yes, all the trophies eventually escaped Benfica’s clutches, but to reach two of three possible finals and lose the league by one point is hardly the sign of a bad team.

Football, however, like most things, takes on a very different spin in certain context.  After winning the league in his first season as manager, Jorge Jesus has flattered to deceive as Benfiquistas have become painfully accustomed to being envious onlookers as Porto celebrate a third title in a row.  Admittedly, the last one was only lost by one point – a far cry from the 21 point gap in 2010-11 – but that’s little comfort.  The nature of the loss of the title in such dramatic circumstances didn’t exactly help boost the morale of a group of players either, many of whom have performed exceptionally well.

All the psychologists, interested onlookers and nauseatingly optimistic fans will no doubt emphasise, philosophically, that the team will be stronger for all these challenges that were faced.  Some were conquered, and some brought tears.  Either way, whatever side of the fence you sit on in how you assess Benfica’s season, a few things are clear.  As much as the margins for error were unkind to Benfica, there is room for improvement.  Lessons can be learned – and it’s evident some lessons have needed learning for more than one season.Some existing strategies are excellent and should be maintained – but Benfiquistas will hope that the obvious weaknesses in the team get some proper attention before next season kicks off.

So while it may be considerably early to already start talking about next season, Benfica have some time to analyze and understand their mistakes from this campaign.  Here’s my wishlist of items that I hope, come August, the Eagles will have addressed in some form or another.

1. Address the mentality – Respect opponents, implement a hunger to succeed and play without fear

Look at all the teams in recent years who’ve sustained extended periods of success, and a few common threads emerge.  One of the most common is the notion of mentality.  Respecting an opponent regardless of their quality.  Hunger to win that overrides all other possible emotions, especially the fear of losing. It’s a cliché, but the size in the fight of the dog really matters sometimes, because it’s the ingredient that gets certain teams to perform beyond the limitations of their squad or their own apprehension.  Mentally, Benfica are capable of being incredibly composed one game and impossibly paranoid the next.  As an example, against Fenerbache in the second leg of the Europa League semi-final, the team’s mental approach was undeniably superb and they rightly got the plaudits for it.  But after Benfica’s draw with Estoril put the league in the reach of Porto, the team looked incredibly nervous, and each subsequent game against Chelsea, Moreirense, and finally Guimarães, Benfica almost looked like they expected something to go wrong.

http://au.eurosport.com/football/european-football/2013/guimaraes-upset-benfica-to-clinch-portuguese-cup_sto3774075/story.shtml

I for one believe that when the paranoia of such results is the dominant mental state facing the team, the team’s focus is already lost on the objective.  Porto never play Benfica with the fear of losing – they play with the hunger to catch their record.  Hunger is what characterizes those dangerous, energetic and difficult teams in Europe.  In the Champions League final, Bayern Munich were far and away the superior side on paper against Borussia Dortmund, but the men in yellow and black played with no fear, and were carried by the hunger to win, hence their impressive showing.

Benfica need to learn to play the same way.  And they also need to learn that disrespecting opponents will also not go far.  I agree completely with the sentiment raised in the excellent recent “Talking to The Doll” Benfica podcast, where it was suggested that Benfica didn’t approach the Estoril and Taça de Portugal final with the right levels of respect.  After the victory over Maritimo in the league, Benfica celebrated prematurely over possible Liga success – and the suggestion is that they didn’t take their next Liga fixture as seriously as they should have.  In the second half of the Taça de Portugal final against Guimarães, complacency was clearly evident.  Jorge Jesus’ argument that the team was trying to defend their one goal lead was by no means a convincing explanation to the Eagles’ poor levels of concentration that ultimately led to their defeat.

2. Make the changes to the squad that MUST be made

After the title winning side of 2009-10 was significantly diminished through the departures of Ramires, Di Maria, Luiz and Ceontrão in subsequent years, the team has been able to recover well in constantly developing reasonably strong sides, while leveraging savvy scouting that has identified solid talent like Gaitàn, Garay, Matic (granted, he was part of a swap deal, but Benfica still needed to be happy with what they were getting) and Pèrez.  The club’s loan strategy has also been interesting, often allowing fringe, but talented players to play elsewhere to keep up match fitness and skill development (especially the youngsters).

But the squad’s composition and use is a major issue that affects their success (or lack thereof). The squad isn’t correctly configured for the tactics favoured by Jorge Jesus, and ironically, some deficiencies from 2011-12 weren’t addressed last season. In transfer terms, Benfica already look set to focus too much on attacking acquisitions for next season, instead of taking special care with the defence. One hopes Benfica can learn from their mistakes and optimize their squad better, especially as their main rivals have already lost two hugely critical players – Moutinho and Rodriguez – to Monaco in the summer.

In my last article, I explained how Benfica’s tactical approach changed with the adjustments made in midfield due to the use of Enzo Pérez in a more central midfield role (as opposed to a central attacking midfield role) created more emphasis for the fullbacks Maxi and Melgarejo to push up to offer width in attack.  Benfica fans will recall in the 2011-12 season having major concerns with the mobility and pace of former left back Emerson, who was largely blamed as the exploited weak link in some big matches that season.  It stands to reason that while Melgarejo has played well under the circumstances, some of his performances this season have been very indicative of the makeshift left back that he is.  Benfica’s expectations don’t exactly give much room for a situation like that.

At right back, Maxi Pereira started displaying uncharacteristic displays of poor decision making and deficiencies in pace, something which Porto eventually leveraged for the crucial winner in the penultimate Liga game of the season.  Benfica are too big a club to afford complacency in players “that pick themselves”.  Almeida may already offer a viable solution to creating more competition for Maxi at RB, or becoming first choice LB (although the latter isn’t preferable due to him being right footed).

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The risks of Benfica’s high defensive line combined with their preferred attacking approach means that central defenders, in particular, need to be able to recover ground quickly should opponents catch them on the counter attack.  With Garay largely expected to leave, and Luisão lacking pace, it’s clear that a major shakeup may be required in the core of Benfica’s backline.  Benfica have been linked with the Serbian Mitrovic, who certainly doesn’t seem to lack the height and muscle, but the issue is pace, and hopefully that’s something that’s prioritized.  Luisão isn’t going to get faster, making him a more vulnerable spot to exploit with each game that passes.  The easier and weaker teams in the Liga aren’t likely to break through the Benfica backline, and last season illustrated that.  But the more tactically savvy, adventurous “smaller” teams and the bigger teams (especially in the Champions League) will know only too well that it’s an obvious weakness to exploit.

Gaitan and Aimar are largely expected to leave as well – and Benfica seem to have found replacements, albeit very young ones in Serbians Filip Djuricic and Lazar Markovic, but neither player will produce the performances of the players they are replacing, so Benfica ideally need to recruit some experience, especially in Aimar’s position.  Another key issue is the management of fatigue.  Jesus would do well to bring in cover for Matic and Pèrez, and actually use it consistently.  Creating a situation of over-reliance on two key players and lacking options on the bench that are match fit, or match ready isn’t a good plan, and it also makes your team predictable after a while.

So assuming that the departures of Garay and Gaitàn are concrete, Benfica certainly have much to do in the transfer market to strengthen the team. That’s why a few more player sales wouldn’t go amiss in financing transfers in the positions of left back, centre back, attacking midfield and cover for right back, defensive midfield and central midfield.

3. Start showing tactical versatility – and stop making big tactical “bungee jumps” in big matches

For most games in the Liga, Jorge Jesus didn’t change much by way of his side’s tactical formation, shape and strategy.  For someone who has favoured 4-1-3-2 for some time, Jesus found ways to create meaningful variance to the tactical shape this season, particularly by using Gaitàn in the hole behind the striker, or applying the mobility of Lima vs. the muscle of Cardozo in the final 3^rd.  Benfica’s tactical shape prioritises penetration and attacking flair above all else, which is understandably required in the Liga, where most teams that play the Eagles are going to sit deep and wait for counter attack opportunities.

Under Jesus, however, Benfica have displayed some obvious tactical vulnerabilities, which, assuming the transfer suggestions above are NOT followed, will need to be addressed in alternative ways.  The first and most obvious one is the tendency to suddenly make surprising team selections or tactical formations in big matches.  Sometimes the gambles can work, but Jesus’ Benfica do not have a particularly good record in those big matches.  A recent example is the Europa League, where the use of Rodrigo in the hole behind Cardozo was an unexpected and brave tactical move, which worked well in the first half until Chelsea played far more narrow in the second half, nullifying the Spaniard’s effectiveness.  Starting with Lima may have been more effective at refining those numerous missed opportunities at goal throughout the game.

We’re a far cry from the days Carlos Martins was used as a right wing, so things have improved, but the criticism here is simply that Jesus tends to try these (untested) adjustments in matches where the stakes are high – and the room for error small enough to mean the difference between success and failure.

Benfica also needs to recruit defensive options correctly if they’re going to persist with a high defensive line, especially against good sides capable of using this weakness.  None of the current Benfica centre backs give a sense of being particularly quick – and Matic’s skills often get demanded up the pitch in attack, leaving the last two defenders exposed to a counter.  Either Benfica prioritise speed ahead of height (which they don’t seem to have done with Mitrovic) in a central defender or defensive midfielder, otherwise Jesus needs to start using his taller centre backs properly.  As an example, defending with a deep lying defensive line but a high pressing attacking line would typically encourage the long ball aerial ball for a tall Benfica defence to win and control in the midfield.

Benfica also would do well to prioritise the recruitment of a proper attacking midfielder in the centre to become the “metronome” through which space can be created by pulling centre backs out of position in their box, something Aimar was exceptional at in his day.  Benfica’s strength on the flanks is obvious, but it makes them a very predictable team at times and often one gets the impression Jesus is relying on the extensive skills of players like Salvio, Gaitàn and Ola John to create penetration in attack rather than relying on tactical variations.

Jorge Jesus and his side also both need to learn how to defend a lead against big sides.  Against Porto and Guimarães, the strategy of “keeping the result” was allegedly attempted – and ultimately failed.  Notwithstanding bad luck, Benfica would do well to learn from other sides some very basic ideas in defending such leads.  For example – use two lines of four, the deepest line staying around the edge of the 18 yard area to deal with high balls and crosses into the box.  The other line sits slightly in front, picking up long range shots, through balls and runs into the box.  When the ball is won – keep it.  Don’t resort to pointless counter attacks.  Players who hold up the ball well and retain, or cycle the ball well are critical to such strategies.  There’s nothing more frustrating than chasing a side towards the end of the game, when you’re desperate for the ball to recover a goal to get back in the game.

Benfica’s approach instead makes it quite easy for opponents, committing too much in attack and paying very little attention to retaining the ball.  It’s not attractive football – but something tells me Benfiquistas won’t care too much if the results are earned because of it.  If they can’t do such things – they shouldn’t be trying to defend leads in the manner that they currently do, because it clearly doesn’t work.

4. Have a clear strategy to win the Liga… and learn from the last 3 seasons

http://www.goal.com/en-ng/match/85403/porto-vs-benfica/preview

If there is one element Benfica could certainly improve dramatically, it is their strategic approach to a league campaign, which almost worked this season, save for the team’s possible complacency in ensuring 3 points against Estoril.  Benfica shouldn’t have created the situation where they relied on the result in the Dragão to dictate their league campaign – because it’s clear the team wasn’t convinced that they could beat their rivals.  While the 2010-11 was a campaign where Porto’s squad and coach clearly showed tactical superiority, the last two seasons’ failures can be argued more by Benfica’s inability to win key games and manage their campaign combined with Porto’s opportunistic manner of “smelling blood” and taking advantage at just the right time.

It stands to reason – at the beginning of this campaign, surely the penultimate fixture of the season away to Porto stood out as a possible title decider?  Yet, going into that game, Benfica would have had 28 games – including one at home to Porto – where an unassailable lead could have been developed.  If Porto wasn’t going to be beaten at their ground, then the game against Estoril especially is where Benfica had to plan ahead and know that victory was essential.  Benfica shouldn’t have allowed this game to become a title decider, and they had 28 games before it to ensure that was not the case.  Irony and history now combine to illustrate that a possibly unassailable 4 point lead could have been taken into the Dragão – but after Estoril preyed on Benfica’s tactical frailties, Porto took full advantage of the timid approach shown by the Eagles.

That’s not to say that it’s acceptable the Benfica aren’t capable of getting a result at the Dragão – but Benfica, despite having an arguably better squad for two seasons, don’t seem to believe – or know – how they can beat Porto.

To win the Liga, it’s become quite a simple formula then – Benfica have to probably win 28 games, or figure out how to get results against Porto.  With Rodriguez and Moutinho leaving Porto, the opportunity for an arguably superior Benfica to make up ground in season 2013-14 could be ripe, depending on who Porto sign to replace their stars.

5. Prioritise the Liga and European competition… and rotate intelligently

One of the things that counted in Porto’s favour this season was that by the time Benfica visited the Dragão for that key fixture, Benfica were still fighting on three fronts.  Key players like Matic and Pèrez were playing twice a week consistently in the business end of these competitions, which is a risky strategy for the fatigue given their importance.

That’s not to say the idea of a treble (or quadruple, briefly) wasn’t romantic to Benfiquistas.  But the club has to prioritise.  The Liga will always be the bread and butter of Benfica’s success – always.  Domestic dominance doesn’t come from the Taça de Liga or the Taça de Portugal.  These are two lovely trophies with history, but if Benfica are going to progress as a club, there are only two competitions worth considering – the Liga, and the Champions League.

Consider for example, that the Eagles’ forage into the quarterfinals of the Champions League in 2011-12 earned them €20,7m, compared to €14.2m in 2010-11, when an exit in the Champions League group stage was followed by a subsequent semi-final appearance in the Europa League.  As reference, Porto, who did not qualify for the Champions League that year due to a 3^rd place finish in the Liga in 2009-10, earned a mere €7.9m from the Europa League in 2010-11 … and they won the competition!

The Champions League isn’t just about prestige – it’s about finances, and while Benfica’s scouting and transfer business has produced some deals to rival those of Porto in recent years (Luiz, Ramires, Di Maria, Ceontrão, Javi Garcia, Witsel in particular), the club shouldn’t be relying on lucrative player sales to finance its squad changes (especially since player sales often implies the sale of key players that Benfica can’t really afford to lose, but often do).

Benfica need to start prioritizing the Liga and the Champions League, and use the Taça de Liga and / or the Taça de Portugal as the competition where fringe or younger players are used to give them experience, or keep them match fit.  That’s not to disrespect the domestic cups, but ultimately, they matter little to the vision of making Benfica strong on domestic and European shores, simply because the Liga and Champions League have a far wider audience and financial profile. Porto may have been less successful in reaching the latter stages of the Champions League or the Taça de Portugal, but they’ve ended the season having benefitted from playing 9 matches less.  Considering that their squad was thinner than that of Benfica in certain positions, the fact that they’ve walked away with the Liga title is also a function of how they’ve prioritized and managed their squad over the season.

And so ends the wishlist.  There’s a simpler version for many Benfiquistas of course … do whatever it takes to win the Liga and beat Porto for once!  And for some others, an even simpler version than that – change the manager…!   And sadly, much of the above is not likely to happen unless Jorge Jesus’ challenges his own stubborn managerial ideals, or the Benfica structures do not support him with the signing of the players he really needs.

But either way, assuming he stays, whatever changes are made by Jorge Jesus and/or Benfica for season 2013-14, one thing is for certain – after the near-success of season 2012-13, expectations will be high to translate Benfica’s recent underachievement into fortune and glory.

Here’s hoping.

This article also appeared on Outside of the Boot in June 2013.

Talking Benfica with Alfredo, Neil and Steve

My appearance in Episode #72 of the Benfica Talking to Da Doll podcast, with Alfredo Fumacas, Neil Fernandes and Steve Santos as we discuss pre-season matters, specifically Benfica's new signings and how they seem to be shaping up.  Awesome!

Bittersweet for Benfica – How 10 months of glory collapsed in a few weeks



http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2331573/Benficas-Oscar-Cardozo-shoves-manager-Jorge-Jesus-cup-final-collapse.html

For all the religious anecdotes (inappropriate or otherwise) one could make about Jorge Jesus, Benfica’s coach, one thing is certain. He would be the first person wishing he could work a miracle or two given the last few weeks for his club.

In the space of 5 days, Benfica, fresh off an incredible unbeaten streak domestically (their last defeat coming over a year ago on the 9 April 2012 to local rivals Sporting) suddenly saw the incredible foundations of a promising season crushed with back to back defeats to Porto and Chelsea in domestic and European competition. Any Benfiquistas seeing trebles in their eyes came straight back to Earth with a devastating halt.

It wasn’t just the fact that Benfica lost those matches too. Consider the significance of the league run – Benfica had been in pole position in the league for the last 8 rounds, with just 2 to play. And even after the match against Estoril didn’t go according to the script (drawn at home), it was still Benfica’s title to lose going into the visit at the Dragão, with the Eagles 2 points ahead. Jesus could hardly have masterminded a better title challenge than this… or could he?

Regardless, Porto effectively dug a knife and twisted it deeply as the winner, scored in the 92nd minute, left Benfica with no chance to recover the match, and the title with it. Suddenly all the efforts of staying just a step ahead of Porto for most of the season collapsed. Months of outstanding results – now fruitless. To respond from such a demoralizing defeat with such a spirited performance against Chelsea in their first European final for 23 years seemed unlikely – but that’s what Benfica delivered. Yet fate dealt a cruel blow again, waiting till the 92nd minute to deal its hand through Ivanovic’s header.

The defeat to Guimarães in the final of the Taça added insult to injury. According to Jesus, the team set out to defend their slender 1-0 lead, which was concerning for two reasons. Benfica clearly don’t know how to defend slender leads in pressure matches; and this strategy was an unusually timid choice given the Eagles’ superior squad. Benfica should have gone to the final planning on putting in a solid shift. Instead, as the 2nd half wore on, the Eagles looked lethargic and complacent, and this ultimately was deservedly punished.

Performances vs. Results

Last season, Champions League winners Bayern Munich’s season looked a far cry from their current campaign. In 2011-12, Bayern were runners-up in all respects – the Bundesliga, the DFB-Pokal (German Cup) and the Champions League. A season that held promise for 3 trophies unraveled. This wasn’t a terrible Bayern side at all – after all, no-one gets to a Champions League final in particular by accident – but somehow, even in front of their own fans in the final, the ball didn’t want to go in often enough. A trophyless season that was deemed by some as a failure, yet Bayern got to the last hurdle of all their races, and were possibly unlucky to lose the latter two in particular.

http://www.footballtop.com/news/europa-league-results-benfica-3-1-fenerbahce

Benfica’s season looks remarkably similar in a sense – their league performance has been even better. It took penalties for Braga to eliminate the Eagles in the semi-finals of the Taça da Liga. They reached the final of the Taça da Portugal. They reached the final of the Europa League. They finished 2nd by a mere point in the Liga, winning 24 of 30 games. They’ve did this despite various setbacks and challenges. A bizarre incident in a pre-season friendly which left captain Luisão suspended until November. The deadline day transfers of (then) crucial midfielders Javi Garcia and Axel Witsel. And a squad (arguably) light on depth in key areas, especially in midfield and fullback positions.

It suggests some debate – has it really been a poor season for Benfica? Is it worse to lose at the final hurdle instead of being tripped up halfway during the race? Does Jesus get judged on the trophies and nothing else? And what, if anything, lacks in the Benfica setup that could have been fixed to avoid a possible treble of missed opportunities rather than trophies?

Big Match Tempers

http://www.abola.pt/nnh/ver.aspx?id=404871

“@_AraujoB: These last 2 seasons hasn't been about who's better, Benfica or Porto. It's been about how Benfica can't wrap up the title.”

The notion behind the tweet above by Bruno Araujo is not uncommon. There’s a fair suspicion held by many that in the “big” games, Benfica flatters to deceive, relying too much on Porto’s mistakes to prosper domestically, or on superior talent to prevail on the field. Similar sentiments are held when Benfica play top sides in the Champions League. It’s a fair statement given the current season. The Europa League final is a perfect example of this, where Chelsea’s experience from 3 major European finals in 5 years clearly counted in their favour in winning the game despite playing up to Benfica’s dominance. Even though domestically, Benfica were quite unlucky to lose to Porto recently, the fact is that Jesus’ record against them in the league generally makes for poor reading. Under Jesus, Benfica have beaten Porto once in league competitions, in his very first encounter against them in 2009. The last couple of matches against Porto seem to always become crucial in swinging the league title. Last season, 2 defeats in 3 games (including a crucial one to Porto) effectively lost the momentum needed to catch the eventual winners, despite winning 8 league matches in a row prior to that.

Big match temperament remains an issue. The team does certainly possess some capable characters who haven’t gone missing in some of the big matches (Matic, Pérez come to my mind at least). Composure isn’t consistent, but this team did play better this season than the last. If anything, Benfica’s over-reliance on certain players to always perform is perhaps what cost them most. If they seem to run out of steam towards the end of the season, questions should be asked of how “fresh” the alternatives are. For example, were Matic and Pérez over-utilised? Are we really surprised that alternative players were ineffective if they were not used? An example is Carlos Martins, who got himself sent off in Benfica’s crucial draw against Estoril. That result is the one which Jesus himself admitted probably lost Benfica the title.

However, even when looking at the Porto and Chelsea matches as examples – ironically, one could argue Benfica didn’t lack a mental aptitude to execute the tactics presented to them. What could be argued as a lack of big match temperament could easily be called bad luck. Benfica defended Porto fairly well for 70-odd minutes, forcing Porto to open up the game more to press the advantage. Had Kelvin not managed to get a yard on Maxi Pereira to score the winner for Porto, it would have ended a draw at the Dragão, and Benfica would have had their resolve celebrated, not condemned. Similar arguments can be made for some of the play in the Europa League final. Benfica created chances that were there to be taken – Chelsea set out to defend, and they did so quite well. In both these matches, the margins for error were desperately thin.

The best example where the big match tempers clearly failed miserably was the Taça final against Guimarães, where Benfica seemed far too relaxed with matters – and were rightly and duly punished.

Benfica’s squad and tactical adjustments this season

http://bigstory.ap.org/photo/portugal-soccer-578

Small margins for error and bad luck in some cases doesn’t mean Benfica didn’t contribute to their failings. It begins with Benfica’s squad, and the way the team’s tactical set up has worked. Typically, Jesus’ strategy has relied substantially on utilizing players with greater technical skills, able to execute the possession style quick passing movement, layered with some ability to beat opposing defenders off the dribble to create space for teammates.

Tim Palmer’s excellent scouting report highlights this in how Benfica play their football.  Jesus has tried to build a side versatile enough to play as the aggressor, often enjoying far more possession and being invited to take the attacking initiative against most sides in the Liga that sit deeper than become adventurous against the strong Benfica attack. It’s not often that Benfica play sides with the stronger lineups of Chelsea, but when they do, Benfica are capable of playing deeper and relying on direct counter-attacks (as they displayed against Porto) but this happens far less often as the Eagles become more confident of their attacking brand of football.

Attack has never really been the problem though. Benfica have managed to win marginally more games this season (39 out of 56 thus far vs. 34 out of 52 last season). The acquisitions of striker Lima has offered a few things - additional mobility and speed for variations to creating space in the box, an alternative style of attack, or if nothing else the chance to give Cardozo a rest. Signing Ola John has also offered cover for Gaitán, or the option to play both of them in a 4-2-3-1 formation with Gaitán in a shadow striker role.

Benfica’s improved attacking prowess (123 goals in 56 matches this season vs. 105 goals in 52 matches last season) is impressive considering limited use of a CAM (central attacking midfielder) this season to add depth and space to the attacking effort. Previous seasons saw the genius of veteran Pablo Aimar or the talented Axel Witsel orchestrating the space in the middle to complement the threat on the flanks, sitting in the middle of the 3 in a 4-1-3-2 formation. This season, the shape has changed sometimes to a loose 4-2-2-2 or 4-2-3-1, where Matic sits deepest, with Pérez slightly ahead of him playing a more box to box role (It’s not dissimilar to the diamond formation Benfica used in Jesus’ first season in charge, except with the central midfielder playing a less advanced role). It’s a change which has adapted the team’s attacking shape, forcing Gaitán (or Ola John) and Salvio to cut inside towards the middle, making the fullbacks Melgarejo and Pereira push further forward to offer width.

But using that system comes with risks – the attacking shape of Benfica demands that even Matic (as the cover in front of the centre backs) often sits further forward than one would expect, making the team vulnerable to counter attacks, especially if Maxi and Melgarejo have pushed further forward, and the only protection is an average paced Garay and an aging Luisão.

Tactical risks in Benfica’s chosen approach

http://www.3news.co.nz/VIDEO-All-goals-2-1-Chelsea-Vs-Benfica-Lisbon-Europa-League-final-2013/tabid/415/articleID/297988/Default.aspx

Jesus has always favoured playing a high defensive line. But using one requires the right personnel to manage its risks. Last season’s disappointments were almost at time blamed exclusively on former left back Emerson, whose lack of pace was an easy weakness to exploit in a system that is sensitive to the quality of the fullbacks pushing up to support the attack. Benfica still haven’t successfully replaced Fabio Ceontrão, who was the only player who arguably possessed the right blend of attacking and defensive qualities required in such a system. When teams are able to pressure the Benfica full backs into their own area, it effectively nullifies the possession football Benfica play. Matic, Garay and Luisão are used as “safety-nets” to pass back to in order to prevent loss of the ball and keep the pressure going, while the fullbacks offer width. When the width disappears, the other 3 players are forced to retreat backwards to cover the spaces in the centre, meaning they’re defending deep instead of playing in the middle of the field, supporting the attack and ball retention.

This is exactly what Porto achieved to great effect in the Clássico recently, creating a massive gap between Lima and the rest of the Benfica midfield, which is why the Benfica attack were so ineffective at retaining the ball. Ironically, the tactical adjustments made by Vitor Pereira in the second half played to Benfica’s advantage – the substitutions spread Porto far wider into a 4-4-2 formation, which created far more space for Benfica to use through the middle, and perhaps led to that crucial moment when Maxi Pereira decided to push a little too far forward than he should have. How ironic that a season after lamenting the weaknesses down Benfica’s left flank, Porto found their winner down the opposite one.

The Europa League final exposed similar weaknesses but in different parts of the pitch. Chelsea resorted to their now infamous “sit deep and counter quickly” strategy, even deciding early on that the key flank to attack was down Benfica’s left, where Melgarejo was identified as the weak link. To his credit, the young Paraguayan did a good job to contain the counters by former Benfica player Ramires. With young Portuguese fullback Almeida impressing again on the opposite flank against a much slower threat in Oscar, Chelsea decided the weakness to exploit was right down the middle. Garay missed the flick-on to Torres, and while Luisão did well to match Torres’ speed, his decision to try and make the tackle was (harshly) the wrong one as it gave the Spaniard the chance to get in behind his marker and create the one-on-one situation. In that particular passage of play, ironically, it’s not even a “classic” counter attack. Cech started the move, and Benfica were very slow to adjust from their positioning in midfield.

It stands to reason that if Benfica are going to continue to play with a higher line, one of two things needs to change – their ability to break down teams that sit deep and defend well (which they don’t lack, mostly), or their ability to recover against counter-attacks. Against Chelsea, Benfica’s attacking prowess was wasted if it wasn’t going to produce the goals it warranted – weaker teams in the Liga will inevitably buckle, but Chelsea won a Champions League title because they can defend rather well for long periods. Benfica may have looked impressive – but it wasn’t going to work unless the countless half-chances turned into goals. Ironically, Benfica may have been better served to switch the tactics slightly they employed in the Porto and Chelsea matches; sitting on the counter against Chelsea would have forced the Blues out, exposing their lack of speed at the back, while being more aggressive with Porto once they’d made the switch to 4-4-2 could have been worth the risk given how many players they were committing forward. But all this easier said in hindsight, right?

Who takes the blame?

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2331573/Benficas-Oscar-Cardozo-shoves-manager-Jorge-Jesus-cup-final-collapse.html

It then raises the question, once again, of tactical choices. Few could blame Benfica for playing for a draw against Porto. Yes, it wasn’t necessarily positive, nor did it illustrate the “courage” many Benfiquistas would desire of the team – but it did illustrate a bit more thought in game management from the manager and his team. No need to risk it, after all – and the team was set up to defend and counter even on the team-sheet (although the presence of Cardozo to hold up the ball wouldn’t have gone amiss). And again, Benfica executed this largely well, limiting the opportunities for Porto to score very well. If Kelvin hadn’t found the pace in behind Maxi Pereira, Jesus’ chosen approach would have won him plaudits. Instead, football is a dramatic game of margins, and few – even Porto fans – will give Vitor Pereira any credit for masterminding back to back Porto campaigns with just 1 defeat.

But that is exactly how small the margin for error is, and Benfica may well focus more on other dropped points (Estoril earlier in the week, or any other draw earlier in the season – the draw at the Luz to Porto was also quite important) as the key points when the season’s campaign was lost. Benfica shouldn’t have been going into this game relying on its result. Especially when there appears to be a latent inability within the team of knowing how to win matches against Porto. If Benfica are going to be champions again, it’s coming to the point that they need to figure out how to win the other 28 matches to minimize the impact of maximum points dropped against Porto, since they clearly do not yet know how to dominate their rivals.

Against Chelsea, the chosen tactics were again well executed, the surprise name on the team sheet (Rodrigo) started well, and even for the weaknesses in the high defensive line, Benfica coped well for a time against Ramires and Torres, and even managed to limit the dangerous through-ball vision of Mata, Oscar and Lampard. Their ruthlessness was the issue – and an experienced side like Chelsea was always going to find “that” chance to score at the worst possible moment. Were the tactics correct? It’s difficult to say, because Chelsea are the kind of side that didn’t need to be the best team on the pitch to win the game, but Benfiquistas don’t exactly get enamoured with confidence when games are approached passively by their side either.

In the Taca, Benfica started brightly, and even got a slice of luck for the opening goal – but they played in the second half like a frightened team, anxious to avoid mistakes, instead of being more assertive and confident. Guimaraes’ persistence paid off. They didn’t win by being more skilled or tactically astute – they won because Benfica lost the mental battle in their own dressing room.

For some – me included – Jorge Jesus still doesn’t truly convince as the tactical mastermind. Granted, his team hasn’t performed poorly this season overall. The results at the end, though, will not show it, and there is significant mixed opinion about him. In one camp, the argument is based on the appreciation of his determination to raise this club to its previous heights, combined with some solid attacking principles, some great development of players and excellent scouting. Mistakes have been punished very harshly – but again, it’s 2nd place by 1 point. Two finals out of three. The team made it to the final hurdles but didn’t win the race. Margins defined by bad luck and silly mistakes. Therefore, keep Jesus – if he’s made the mistakes, they are few.

The other camp still considers the notion that a weakened Porto has yet again managed to undo the Benfica team – largely due to the latter’s inability to capitalize on the misfortunes of their northern neighbours. The margins for error weren’t forgiving, but Benfica haven’t managed their options well either. Following their dramatic win away at Maritimo, causing scenes of highly premature celebration by the Eagles, there can be arguments for some poor management of the fixture at home to Estoril. Take nothing away from the visitors, but fate seemed to play with Benfica when Pérez had to leave the field early with injury. Benfica’s over-reliance on Matic and Pérez perhaps has cost them this season. It’s easy to speculate after the fact, but I’m not so convinced Benfica would have suffered in matches like this had Jesus actively kept other players involved.

Existing squad weaknesses also weren’t understood and addressed, especially at fullback. Melgarejo hasn’t consistently inspired confidence, and it’s proven by the fact that the experienced heads at Chelsea decided his flank would be the epicenter of the majority of their attacks in the majority of the Europa League final. Benfica also didn’t manage the weakness in pace with the centre backs (a key issue that was exploited successfully by opponents in the last few matches of the season).

Reflections of the season… and the future of Jorge Jesus

Park the debate about Jorge Jesus for a second. Whether he stays or goes, or should stay or should go, despite the great performances in 2012-13 being undone in a few weeks, Benfica should reflect on the potential. The club’s consistency in Europe over the last few years has seen them rise in the UEFA rankings to 9th place. After dropping to Europe’s second tier competition, they reached the final, and were a worthy contender to win the whole thing, losing only to a team who undid Barcelona and Bayern Munich a mere 12 months prior. They lost one game the entire domestic season to a side who haven’t tasted league defeat for over 50 games. They reached the semi-finals of one cup competition and the final of the other. All this while missing their captain for nearly 3 months, and conceding to the sale of 2 of their most influential players, and still lacking a proper left back! Many of their players stepped up and matured in various respects, especially Artur, Matic, Pérez, Gaitan, Ola John, Salvio, Cardozo, Lima and Garay. Youngsters showed promise, especially Andre Gomes and Almeida.

Mere seconds separated Benfica from glory against Porto, and more time to claim it against Chelsea. They aren’t the first team to concede crucial goals in the 92nd minute – they won’t be the last. They messed up against Guimarães – but they learnt a valuable lesson in being reminded to never underestimate whatever opponent is in front of you, regardless of perceived advantages.

So perhaps not a bad season. Certainly a season that for a time, many Benfiquistas could be proud of – and one that, regardless of its results, add hope of future glory. 

http://catedraticosfutebol.blogspot.com/

The debate then – would a manager other than Jesus have avoided the above? Would a manager other than Jesus also have experienced the same bad luck? Or would they have won something? Or maybe even a historic treble? Citing the comparison earlier, Bayern kept Jupp Heynckes after last season’s treble of disappointments… but Jupp has history. He’s got the results before. He’s done it. He doesn’t need to talk it up.

Those of us who remain unconvinced by Jorge Jesus, especially should he remain at the club… will demand much of him next season. The bittersweet end to this season, for many, including me, turned him from destined messiah to unconvincing preacher, because after all, in the end, performances are not the currency of football – results are.

Therefore Jorge Jesus - the lessons should have been learnt loud and clear by now. If you stay – you’re on borrowed time.

Make it count.


This article also appeared on Outside of the Boot in May 2013.